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Military Deception: Equivalent to Intelligence, Maneuver and Fires

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

Military deception (MILDEC) is an ancient aspect of warfare still utilized to mislead adversarial leaders deceiving them concerning friendly force activities and intentions. Evidence indicates that skillful application of MILDEC is both operational art and science with advantages gained setting conditions for mission success. Unfortunately, MILDEC as a core capability is subsumed under the information operations (IO) umbrella and is absent focus and attention afforded the six joint functions: intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, protection, command and control, and sustainment. Research indicates commanders use joint functions to synchronize military activities in time and space. This paper argues that MILDEC should be included as a joint function in U.S. military doctrine to achieve desired effects with respect to adversarial leader decisions and decision making. It provides a doctrinal overview of MILDEC, IO and joint functions with a brief explanation of joint function evolution. This paper also examines notable military theorists' views on MILDEC, and analyzes historical and recent campaign utilization of deception. And lastly, conclusions are drawn about the relevance of MILDEC as a joint function with recommendations describing how to create a broader information-centric joint function.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Background	1
Discussion and Analysis	5
Analytical Conclusion	15
Recommendation	16
Final Remarks	18
Endnotes	20
Bibliography	22

INTRODUCTION

What is deception? Some believe its action taken to trick the enemy. Others postulate deception as an extension of concealment used to disguise forces from enemy detection. Both opinions are incomplete descriptions of military deception (MILDEC). In fact, MILDEC has significance as a supporting operation to many historical campaigns and battles.¹ Similar to other operations, MILDEC has a defined task, purpose and military objective requiring synchronization with comparable capabilities. Unfortunately, MILDEC is subsumed under information operations (IO) as a core capability and is not uniformly incorporated into joint planning processes. Doctrine has, however, established a loose correlation between MILDEC and joint functions creating hope that planners will come to realize MILDEC's importance.

Evidence suggests that MILDEC should be incorporated as a joint function in U.S. military doctrine to enable operational commanders to achieve desired effects with respect to adversarial leader decisions and decision making. This paper will provide a MILDEC, joint function and IO doctrinal overview with a brief explanation of joint function evolution. It will also examine notable military theorists' views on MILDEC, and analyze historical and recent campaign use of MILDEC in an effort to formulate conclusions and recommendations on the relevance of MILDEC as a joint function.

BACKGROUND

Current joint doctrine seems to agree MILDEC can be utilized as a separate and distinct function in certain instances. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, states IO core, supporting and related capabilities support more than one joint function, and some capabilities may be considered independent functions.² MILDEC is a core capability that can

be employed as an independent joint function (see Figure 1).³ Why not formally incorporate MILDEC as a joint function if doctrine already acknowledges its significance? It makes sense to include MILDEC in light of current requirements for independent application.




Figure 1. Information operations capabilities related to joint functions (reprinted from Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 13 February 2006), III-2.

Information is an activity critical to national security. As such, military forces should attempt to dominate the information environment at all levels of war.⁴ The information environment is characterized by three dimensions: physical, informational and cognitive. The most important being the cognitive dimension encompassing all aspects of human decision making, perceptions, beliefs and understanding. MILDEC is one of two IO capabilities that affect the cognitive dimension.⁵ Thus, a logical association between cognitive dimension importance and MILDEC importance can be made.

MILDEC is defined as “those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.”⁶ Deception operations are characterized by a focused target, clear

objective, centralized planning and control, security, timeliness, and integration into the overall campaign or major operation. The means, or methods, for MILDEC execution include forces, communications, and administrative documentation.⁷ MILDEC's focus on the adversarial leader's decision making sets it apart from all other IO capabilities except PSYOP. PSYOP attempts to affect a target audience as well but utilizes truthful information to influence attitudes and perceptions.⁸

JP 3-13, Information Operations, defines and describes IO joint doctrine. It describes IO "as the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own."⁹

IO consists of five core and five supporting capabilities, and three related capabilities, or activities. The core capabilities consist of MILDEC, PSYOP, OPSEC, EW and CNO. Of these core capabilities, MILDEC, PSYOP and OPSEC have historical significance in supporting successful campaigns and major operations.¹⁰ IO supporting capabilities include information assurance, physical security, physical attack, counterintelligence and combat camera. The three related capabilities consist of public affairs, civil-military operations, and defense support to public diplomacy. These related capabilities have purposes separate and distinct from IO, but whose activities effect the information environment.¹¹

The doctrinal term joint function first appeared in joint doctrine as part of change 1 to JP 3-0 in February 2008.¹² JP 3-0 states "joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help JFCs [joint force commander] integrate, synchronize, and direct

joint operations.”¹³ There are six joint functions exercised at the operational level of war: intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, protection, command and control, and sustainment. Other activities that support joint functions include IO core, supporting and related capabilities. Operational commanders organize and direct forces to perform joint functions to achieve operational and strategic objectives.¹⁴

Joint functions are similar to the principles of war in that both represent fundamental beliefs and activities utilized as tools in planning and executing campaigns. The joint functions described in JP 3-0 were originally adopted from the U.S. Army’s battlefield operating systems (BOS).¹⁵ There were seven Army BOS used primarily to coordinate and synchronize capabilities during battles and engagements: intelligence, maneuver, fire support, mobility / survivability, air defense, command and control, and combat service support. Ultimately, joint doctrine writers modified the seven Army BOS while retaining BOS intent of synchronizing activities in time and space. Likewise, the Marine Corps adopted the Army BOS in the late 1980’s adding aviation as an additional activity. The Marine Corps subsequently refined and revised their framework combining aviation with fires.¹⁶ It is important to note these capabilities evolved based on analysis of joint operations at the operational level of war. The Army BOS adaptation into six joint functions represents indoctrination of these capabilities as a defined framework for operational commander and staff use in synchronizing joint operations.

To remain relevant, joint functions as a synchronization framework should be periodically reviewed and refined similar to the scrutiny applied to the principles of war. General Henri Baron de Jomini developed the original seven principles of war based on Frederick the Great’s campaigns. In 1921, GEN John J. Pershing added simplicity and

cooperation to the seven principles due to U.S. Army experiences in World War I. The principle of cooperation became unity of command in 1940 signifying a third modification to Jomini's original principles.¹⁷ Correspondingly, joint functions should be reviewed in light of recent campaigns including Operation Desert Storm and the War on Terror.

Most would agree joint function doctrine should be periodically reviewed for relevance. However, some would argue MILDEC fails to equate, in significance, to intelligence, maneuver or fires. Evidence suggests notable military theorists such as Sun Tzu and Henri Jomini would attest to deception's criticality in achieving military success. Similarly, an emphasis on deception operations throughout history has greatly substantiated its worth to military operations at all levels of war.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Sun Tzu's The Art of War is the most renown of the seven ancient Chinese military classical works. Both Chinese and Japanese militaries studied and analyzed Sun Tzu's teachings in the early part of the eighth century AD. It is widely believed that Napoleon and other prominent European generals studied Sun Tzu's writings as well.¹⁸ Even today, Sun Tzu's principles are studied in professional military education courses taught at the intermediate and senior levels. Most military officers are familiar with Sun Tzu's emphasis on understanding the terrain, knowing the enemy, and understanding your capabilities and limitations.

However, one of Sun Tzu's most fundamental principles is overshadowed by a focus on his explanation of seeing the terrain, enemy and yourself. In actuality, Sun Tzu emphasized and believed warfare hinged on the application of deceit. More specifically, Sun Tzu stated, "Warfare is the Way (Tao) of deception. Thus although [you are] capable, display

incapability to them. When committed to employing your forces, feign inactivity. When [your objective] is nearby, make it appear as if distant; when far away, create the illusion of being nearby.”¹⁹ Sun Tzu’s emphasis on deception, though specifically referenced in only two chapters, resonates throughout his writings. In particular, he acknowledged deceit alone would not gain military success but creates favorable conditions by placing enemy forces in positions of disadvantage while allowing friendly forces to occupy positions of advantage.²⁰

Sun Tzu realized deception’s versatility for employment across the levels of war. More explicitly, Sun Tzu stated that armies had to not only gather intelligence about their adversaries, but also spread misinformation to enemy governments and their allies.²¹ This reference to misinformation implies deception’s use at the operational level capitalizing on the numerous information capabilities and methods available to joint force headquarters. Joint force deception operations nested within strategic deception actions, and supported by tactical deception, would thus contribute to operational success by forcing enemy commander mistakes potentially leading to defeat or destruction of adversarial centers of gravity.

General Jomini, military theorist and historian, also wrote about the value of deception. Jomini believed deception, or demonstrations as he referred to them, could greatly assist in placing the enemy in disadvantageous positions allowing friendly forces to attack at the decisive point and time.²² In the 19th century, military commanders used deception to confuse enemy leaders about their principal direction of movement, primary avenues of attack and ultimate military objectives. Napoleon frequently adhered to these tactics using demonstrations to show forces in one area then withdrawing and attacking in subsequent areas.²³ Although Jomini understood the importance of deception, he was more cautious than

Sun Tzu in its application. Jomini stressed allocating minimal forces to deception and designating deception operations as secondary efforts. He believed deception's value was predicated on an army's ability to mass at the decisive point.²⁴

There are many examples throughout history that demonstrate the importance of deception to military campaigns. World War II provides excellent evidence of deception operation coordination and synchronization from which to draw operational lessons validating the need for MILDEC as a joint function.

Of all allied forces, the Soviet military appears to have had a more thorough understanding of the art of operational deception. A good example was a little known operation in the Lvov-Sandomierz region of the Soviet Union in July 1944. This operation illustrated Soviet Army centralized planning and execution, and highlights their willingness to expend considerable resources to make deception convincing.²⁵

During this operation, the Soviet objective was German Army destruction in the Belorussia and Northern Ukraine areas. The Soviet High Command developed a strategic deception plan to conceal their main effort attack in the Belorussia sector in the north by portraying a false main effort attack in the south vicinity Northern Ukraine.²⁶ Marshal Ivan S. Konev's, 1st Ukrainian Front Commander, operational objectives were to occupy western Ukraine and southeast Poland. To accomplish his objectives, Konev developed a supporting operational deception plan focused on deceiving German commanders about the location of his main attack. He developed a scheme to show strength on his left flank while conducting the true main attacks in the center and right flank. To execute his plan, Konev re-positioned tank and rifle armies from his left flank to the center and right flank while continuously portraying strength on his left.²⁷ Marshal Konev formed an operational planning group to

synchronize deception operations, allocated sufficient combat forces to make a realistic deception plan, and appointed liaison officers to monitor deception activities to ensure success.²⁸

Marshal Konev was successful in re-positioning forces to attack from the center and right flanks defeating the German Army still focused on his left. Konev's deception operation was successful because German intelligence maintained an incorrect picture of Russian forces failing to realize Soviet army movements north, and because Konev cleverly disguised the timing and location of his two-prong attack.²⁹ This example illustrates land force commander use of deception to shape battlefield conditions in order to accomplish objectives. Properly planned and executed, MILDEC can provide an army distinct advantages over its adversary. These advantages may well create opportunities for decisive victory.

British and American use of deception was equally important on Europe's western front. One of the more notable deception operations supported the allied amphibious landing in France. The allies developed a theater-strategic deception plan called Fortitude in the spring of 1944 prior to the Normandy invasion to mislead German commanders, particularly Adolf Hitler, to commit forces in reaction to false threats in France and Norway. Fortitude consisted of two subordinate deception plans called Fortitude North and Fortitude South. Fortitude North's objective was to convince the Germans of an amphibious landing and attack in Norway reinforced with Russian troops to threaten Germany from the north. Fortitude South's objective was to convince German commanders that the main allied assault would occur near Pas De Calais to draw German attention away from the Normandy objective areas. Fortitude North and South's overall intent was to fix German forces in areas

away from Normandy and to make the Germans believe allied amphibious operations would occur in late summer.³⁰

The Fortitude deception plan was a success. It resulted in denying German commanders the ability to reinforce Normandy beachheads, and it kept the German 15th Army fixed in place vicinity Pas de Calais for several months in anticipation of a main allied assault that never materialized.³¹ This represents yet another illustration of major operation dependency on MILDEC for success. It is interesting to note that British enthusiasm for MILDEC exceeded American military interest until mid-way thru the war. Evidence suggests allied forces in Europe, ultimately, embraced MILDEC as indispensable by war's end.³²

Allies in the Pacific theater also relied upon MILDEC to support major operations with equally successful results. One of the many deception plans developed in the Pacific theater involved a theater strategic plan to convince Japan to reinforce the north vice central Pacific.³³ Planners developed a deception plan called Wedlock, based on the overall theater deception plan, to reinforce Japanese concern over allied activity in the Kurils near the Alaskan Aleutian Islands. The deception story included publicizing a conference between Admiral Nimitz and General Buckner, Commanding General of Alaska, in March 1944; creation of a false naval district in the Aleutians; and constructing a dummy air base complete with daily base activities on Holtz Bay. Wedlock was ultimately disbanded but replaced by two tactical deception plans called Husband and Bambino which continued deception activities with emphasis on exaggerating allied troop strengths.³⁴

Deception plans Wedlock, Husband and Bambino were successful in reinforcing Japanese perceptions of a significant threat in the northern Pacific that fixed Japanese troops and aircraft. The Japanese initially stationed 25,000 troops and 38 aircraft in the Kurils, but

increased strength to 70,000 troops and 590 aircraft by the end of deception operations. By comparison, the allied initial strength was 100,000 troops and by deception operations end had reduced to 64,000. Allied aircraft numbers remained relatively constant at 350. More importantly, the Japanese believed allied strength had remained at or above 100,000 troops and 330 aircraft.³⁵

Some would argue that massive force movements and construction of fake facilities would be useless in deceiving the enemy with today's technology. Those who embrace these opinions have assumed away war's uncertainty. The fog of war still exists even though technology has provided unprecedented collection and analysis capability. This natural fog of war coupled with our ability to influence, disrupt, degrade and deny adversarial electronic and human systems creates an even greater cognitive dilemma for enemy leaders. Instead of gaining decision making advantages, modern technology has succeeded in further confusing and overloading enemy systems exasperating their decision making processes.

Evidence suggests MILDEC is as relevant today as it was during the eras of Sun Tzu and Jomini. Research indicates MILDEC remains pertinent to the range of military operations continuing to provide enabling capabilities for operational commanders. During major combat operations, MILDEC's focus is forcing adversarial leaders into taking actions, or inaction, resulting in military culmination.³⁶ Several documents from the Department of Defense highlighted operational and tactical deception as key to the coalition's success during Operation Desert Storm.³⁷ In stability operations, the focus of MILDEC is supporting decisive military operations designed to establish conditions for attainment of the military endstate.³⁸

During Operation Desert Storm, operational planners developed a deception plan targeting Saddam Hussein and senior Iraqi military leadership. The deception story reinforced Iraqi leadership belief of a coalition attack north into Kuwait. Its objective was to keep Iraqi forces oriented south and southwest into Kuwait and prevent them from re-positioning to the west. The deception plan depicted two coalition attacks in Kuwait by the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, and the Army's VII and XVIII Corps with a supporting amphibious Marine assault in the east.³⁹ U.S. Air Force support to the deception operation included air interdiction of Iraqi Army and Navy assets, and achieving air supremacy allowing coalition forces to re-position to the west. Navy and Marine deception consisted of a feint amphibious landing on the Kuwaiti coast to fix Iraqi forces along the coastline. And finally, Army and other U.S. ground force deception included feints and demonstrations along the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian border showing preparations for a frontal attack into Kuwait.⁴⁰

By and large, the coalition deception operation was successful in misleading Iraqi leadership about the true main attack axis and in convincing them to maintain force orientation south into Kuwait. More specifically, the Navy and Marine deception fixed four Iraqi divisions and caused the expenditure of military resources to defend the coast. And, Army and other U.S. ground forces fixed elements of four additional Iraqi divisions and several brigades in the Wadi Al Batin approach from Saudi Arabia into Kuwait.⁴¹

MILDEC played an important role during initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom as well. There were two distinct deception efforts conducted during the major offensive to Baghdad with a third effort occurring by happenstance. All three deception activities targeted Saddam Hussein and his senior military leaders. The first deception effort was

intended to create a perception of a coalition main attack from Jordan. Coalition deception actions included destruction of Iraqi surveillance posts along the Jordanian border coupled with special operating force attacks in western Iraq. The second effort was intended to prevent the Adnan Republican Guard Division from moving to defeat the coalition main attack from the south. Deception actions focused on confusing senior Iraqi leaders about V (US) Corps' main attack planned for the Karbala gap.⁴² The remaining effort was essentially an unplanned target of opportunity. Coalition planners ingeniously turned Turkey's denial of coalition access to its sovereign territory into an additional activity of their overall deception plan. This unexpected third effort focused on preventing the Nebuchadnezzar Republican Guard Division from re-positioning from northern Iraq to south of Baghdad. Coalition forces attempted to convince Iraqi leaders the 4th (US) Infantry Division was in fact going to attack thru Turkey despite apparent Turkish Parliament disapproval.⁴³

Very little has been written about deception operation success in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Preliminary assessments indicate good success in influencing senior Iraqi leadership decisions including those of Saddam Hussein. In particular, deception activities in western Iraq appear to have preoccupied Saddam and altered decisions when confronted with information revealing the true coalition main attack from the south.⁴⁴

Both recent examples emphasize MILDEC's importance to modern warfare. Research indicates MILDEC's continued relevance to campaign success having obviously withstood the test of time. Other armed forces appear to have previously acknowledged this fact. More specifically, Russian armed forces seem to have understood MILDEC's place in coordinating and synchronizing military operations. Russian doctrine has already established MILDEC as a separate capability used to shape conditions for victory. The Russian military has a long

history of utilizing deception, and they have learned to make MILDEC a standard activity of warfare.⁴⁵

Not all great military strategists concurred with MILDEC's merit to campaign success however. On the contrary, Clausewitz wrote that cunning, or deceit, was of minimal importance to military commanders. He said resources required for deception operations degraded your ability to concentrate effects at the decisive point and time. Based on his experiences, Clausewitz believed commanders normally lacked sufficient forces and, therefore, disliked further force division for deception making troops unavailable in time of crisis. To him, deception was a drastic measure used as a last resort when only radical action could seize the initiative from the enemy.⁴⁶ In this regard, Clausewitz believed deception was more suitable for the tactical level of war where surprise was easier to achieve. Since nations could not hide their war preparations and armies could not conceal their movements, Clausewitz explained that surprise was virtually impossible at the operational and strategic level. And because surprise was unachievable at these levels, deception was also insignificant in creating conditions for achieving surprise.⁴⁷

Clausewitz's position regarding deception could not have accounted for today's technology and the advantages it provides in employing all forms of deceit. There are three reasons technology has made deception an excellent option to gain surprise. First, our intra-theater transport capability allows us to maneuver air, land and maritime forces with considerable speed to attack enemy vulnerabilities more accurately. Next, advanced and lethal weaponry makes concentrating effects and massing at decisive points more effective. And lastly, enhanced command, control and communication systems enable us to coordinate and synchronize joint operations despite time and space complexities.⁴⁸ Given Clausewitz's

experiences with large armies, it's understandable that he viewed deception as least desirable. The speed, lethality and precision of modern warfare negate those previously mentioned constraints and provide increased opportunities for employment of deception at all levels of war.

Even so, other skeptics would highlight unsuccessful deception operations as evidence of MILDEC's futility. These critics would further argue resources misappropriated for deception could be utilized reinforcing actual operations contributing directly to mission accomplishment. Operation Tindall, focused on deceiving German High Command in World War II, is one example of a failed subordinate deception operation supporting the Allied invasion of Europe. Operation Tindall was unsuccessful in establishing a credible deception story because of three factors. One, the Allies failed to create the illusion of building an airfield capable of supporting attacks into Norway. Two, they were unsuccessful in establishing effective radio transmissions to support invasion preparation activity. And finally, the Allies failed to depict adequate aircraft bomber preparation for a large-scale invasion.⁴⁹

Nonetheless, analysis trivializes the few unsuccessful deception operations in comparison to the abundant MILDEC success stories throughout history. MILDEC's contributions to mission attainment are apparent in simple deception activities like Operation Scherhorn used by Russian intelligence to deceive German High Command about supply shortages in August 1944, and obvious in historic campaigns such as Operation Barbarossa in which Hitler disguised his intent to invade Russia during World War II.⁵⁰ Unlike Operation Tindall, appropriately synchronized and executed MILDEC enables operational commanders to gain the initiative posturing them for objective achievement.

ANALYTICAL CONCLUSION

Analysis suggests that joint doctrine warrants an information-centric function, but that MILDEC is not suitable for incorporation into U.S. military doctrine as that stand-alone function. There are two reasons for this conclusion. First, MILDEC's relevance diminishes as military operations deviate from traditional high intensity conflicts. In other words, MILDEC does not apply equally within the range of military operations. It appears MILDEC is more advantageous during major combat operations than during stability operations. And second, MILDEC lacks the ability to target civilian populations. It does target civilian decision makers, but is not designed to influence local populations at large. Civilian considerations are increasingly more important during operations and campaigns short of traditional war.

Fundamentally, stability operations differ from major combat operations. As a distinction, stability operations in general emphasize securing local population support vice destroying enemy forces as the operational center of gravity. More specifically, stability operations have become information-based campaigns supported by lethal action instead of traditional warfare in which lethal campaigns have received support from information activities.⁵¹ This fundamental appears to confirm Clausewitz's belief that deception was better employed at the tactical level of war.⁵² Hence, a thin correlation can be made between Clausewitz's argument and MILDEC's limited significance during stability operations.

Unlike major combat operations, the key to military success in stability operations is gaining local populace support thru perception management. People must perceive that security and public services have improved to win them over.⁵³ Information aimed at shaping attitudes, perceptions and behaviors can achieve these effects. MILDEC cannot.

MILDEC is restricted to targeting, not civilian populations, but civilian and military leader decision making. Army Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, former III (US) Corps Commander, described the necessity for controlling attitudes and beliefs best when he said modern warfare requires us to dominate internal and external opinion and perceptions as well as defeating the enemy on the battlefield.⁵⁴

RECOMMENDATION

A recommendation would be to create a new joint function combining the capabilities to influence not only decision makers, but also local populations and the international community. Evidence suggests that these specific audiences contribute in large measure to successful military objective attainment throughout the range of military operations. They are consumers in the information environment, and their perceptions and attitudes have profound impacts on strategy and tactics.

The new joint function could conceivably be entitled “information” and would consist of three distinct capabilities: MILDEC, PSYOP and public affairs (PA). Although combined into a single function, all three capabilities would retain their originally intended purposes. The benefit in consolidation would be two-fold. First, analysis indicates joint staffs could more effectively and efficiently coordinate information activities reducing conflicting themes and messages utilized to influence target audiences. Without a synchronization forcing mechanism, unfavorable perceptions and attitudes could have negative effects jeopardizing mission success. And second, those IO capabilities and related activities focused on the cognitive domain would be consolidated and grouped together to achieve integrated effects against leaders, local populations, and international communities. The remaining IO core

and supporting capabilities would retain their relevance largely as methods to execute joint function activities as described in current doctrine.

MILDEC would continue to target civilian and military decision makers attempting to influence leader actions to shape conditions favorably for friendly forces. To improve MILDEC planning and execution, a recommendation would be to educate officers about deception thru establishment of a formal MILDEC course similar to joint staff officer education courses currently utilized. This course should establish documentation criteria identifying graduates as MILDEC qualified officers enabling human resource managers to assign individuals to appropriate positions. Subsequent research indicated similar conclusions reached by Department of Defense (DoD) IO Roadmap oversight panel members, chartered with IO strategic improvement plan development. Specifically, the panel recommended Joint Forces Staff College designation as lead intermediate and senior level IO curricula developer, as Service school joint IO curricula coordinator, and as centralized Service and joint IO course database developer and maintainer. DoD's desired outcome is a standardized, joint education and training system meeting career requirements of specialized IO technicians and planners. The IO Roadmap was subsequently signed by the Secretary of Defense with approved recommendations currently in various phases of implementation.⁵⁵

Likewise, PSYOP and PA joint doctrine would not change. PSYOP focus would remain on targeting audiences with truthful information in order to shape attitudes and perceptions favorable to friendly objective attainment. Additionally, PA would continue to provide accurate and timely information to the public in support of operational objectives as well. Joint force commanders would continue to use PA to counter enemy misinformation aimed at disrupting public opinion.⁵⁶

What would change are the joint functions outlined in JP 3-0. Joint doctrine action officers would add a seventh function called “information” and its associated definition and description. An implied task would be to review JP 3-13, Information Operations, to determine IO doctrine modification requirements.

FINAL REMARKS

This paper argued MILDEC should been included as a joint function in U.S. military doctrine. Evidence suggested that deceiving enemy decision makers warranted greater emphasis, and should become a function synchronized in campaigns and major operations. Despite this evidence, analysis concluded MILDEC in and of itself should not become a separate joint function. But rather, joint doctrine required an information-centric function capable of influencing the minds of target audiences. This paper recommended creating a new joint function called “information” incorporating capabilities to influence decision maker, local population and international community attitudes and behaviors. This new function would group MILDEC, PSYOP and PA capabilities into a single function. Although grouped together, each capability would retain its doctrinally intended purpose. As a result, the newly developed “information” function could target audiences influencing strategy and tactics.

Why is this analysis important? How does this improve our joint force warfighting capability? This study highlights information’s significance to military operations. Our ability to globally broadcast and disseminate information from the tactical to strategic level has influenced the way America wages war. Information deserves greater operational commander and staff attention. Coordinating and synchronizing information capabilities with intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, protection, command and control, and

sustainment can improve military success. And, MILDEC, PSYOP and PA are central to this success and represent the keys to unlocking information's powerful potential.

ENDNOTES

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- ³ *Ibid.*, III-2.
- ⁴ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Information Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-13 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 13 February 2006), I-3.
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- ⁶ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Military Deception*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.4 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 13 July 2006), I-1.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, I-2 – I-7.
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- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, I-6.
- ¹² Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, iii.
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- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*
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- ²² Henri Baron de Jomini, *The Art of War*, trans. from the French by G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971), 222 – 224.
- ²³ *Ibid.*
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*
- ²⁵ Richard N. Armstrong, "Soviet Operational Deception: The Red Cloak", *Combat Studies Institute*, December 1988, <http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/> (accessed 13 September 2008).
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, 17 – 18.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, 19 – 22.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, 22 – 23.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, 43 – 44.
- ³⁰ Milan Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare*, (Newport, RI: United States Naval War College, 2007), VII-102 – VII-105.
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- ⁵³ Thomas F. Metz, "Massing Effects in the Information Domain," *Military Review*, Special Edition: Counterinsurgency Reader, 1 October 2006, <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 22 September 2008).
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